Paper 2025/1814

SoK: Is Proof-of-Useful-Work Really Useful?

Abstract

Proof-of-work (PoW)-based consensus mechanisms have long been criticized for their high resource (electricity, e-waste) consumption and reliance on hash puzzles, which have no utility beyond cryptocurrencies. Proof-of-Useful Work (PoUW) has emerged as an alternative whose mining objective is expected to provide societal utility. Despite numerous designs, PoUW lacks practical relevance and theoretical scrutiny. In this paper, we provide a systematization of knowledge (SoK) on PoUW, focusing on security-economic trade-offs. We build the taxonomy to discuss core principles (difficulty adjustment, verifiability, etc.), architecture, trade-offs, and economic incentives. We examine more than 50 PoUW constructions where we find recurring shortcomings. We introduce a formal economic model of PoUW for miner incentives, solution reusability, and external market value to the security budget. To validate our hypothesis, we employ a Toulmin-based evaluation of claims on the security and energy efficiency of these constructions. Our findings show that PoUW is actually not as useful as expected, since the economic and societal utility do not contribute to the security budget. Finally, we highlight design recommendations for PoUW that integrate verifiable computation, partial incentive allocation, and utility-aware difficulty adjustment.