Paper 2025/179
Probing Secure Composability Without Fresh Randomness: Theory and Application to Ascon
Abstract
Side-channel attacks (SCAs) pose a significant threat to the implementations of lightweight ciphers, particularly in resource-constrained environments where masking—the primary countermeasure—is constrained by tight resource limitations. This makes it crucial to reduce the resource and randomness requirements of masking schemes. In this work, we investigate an approach to minimize the randomness complexity of masking algorithms. Specifically, we explore the theoretical foundations of higher-order masking schemes that eliminate the need for online (fresh) randomness by relying solely on offline randomness present in the initial input shares. We demonstrate that round-based ciphers with linear diffusion layers can support such deterministic composition, where the diffusion layer acts as a refresh subcircuit. This ensures that, up to a threshold number, probes placed across rounds remain independent. Based on this observation, we propose composition theorems for probing-secure masking. On the practical side, we instantiate our framework using known deterministic first- and second-order masked S-boxes and provide software implementations of Ascon’s protected permutation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in TCHES 2025
- Keywords
- Side-ChannelMaskingRandomness ComplexityAscon
- Contact author(s)
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v jahandideh @ cs ru nl
b mennink @ cs ru nl
lejla @ cs ru nl - History
- 2025-07-14: last of 2 revisions
- 2025-02-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/179
- License
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CC BY-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/179, author = {Vahid Jahandideh and Bart Mennink and Lejla Batina}, title = {Probing Secure Composability Without Fresh Randomness: Theory and Application to Ascon}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/179}, year = {2025}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/179} }