Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How

Pranav Garimidi; Joachim Neu; Max Resnick

Paper 2025/1772

Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How

Pranav Garimidi

, a16z Crypto Research

Joachim Neu

, a16z Crypto Research

Max Resnick

, Anza

Abstract

Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract rents from users. While there have been many developments at the application layer to reduce the impact of MEV, these approaches largely require auctions as a subcomponent. Running auctions efficiently on chain requires two key properties of the underlying consensus protocol: selective-censorship resistance and hiding. These properties guarantee that an adversary can neither selectively delay transactions nor see their contents before they are confirmed. We propose a multiple concurrent proposer (MCP) protocol offering exactly these properties.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
Contact author(s): pgarimidi @ a16z com
jneu @ a16z com
max resnick @ anza xyz
History: 2025-10-03: approved; 2025-09-28: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2025/1772
License: CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1772,
      author = {Pranav Garimidi and Joachim Neu and Max Resnick},
      title = {Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1772},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1772}
}