Fault Attacks on MPCitH Signature Schemes

Harrison Banda; Jan Brinkmann; Juliane Krämer

Paper 2025/1745

Fault Attacks on MPCitH Signature Schemes

Harrison Banda, University of Regensburg

Jan Brinkmann, University of Regensburg

Juliane Krämer

, University of Regensburg

Abstract

In this work, we present two fault attacks against MPCitH-based signature schemes: we present a key recovery attack and a signature forgery attack, both of which only need a single successful fault injection to succeed. We analyze all five MPCitH-based schemes which are currently analyzed in round 2 of NIST's additional signature standardization process: Mirath, MQOM, PERK, RYDE, and SDitH. Our analysis shows that all five schemes are vulnerable to at least one of the attacks. We validate the practicality of our attacks using the ChipWhisperer setup and discuss countermeasures to prevent the attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. PQCrypto 2026
Keywords: MPCitH Mirath MQOM PERK RYDE SDitH fault attacks
Contact author(s): harrison banda @ ur de
jan brinkmann @ ur de
juliane kraemer @ ur de
History: 2026-01-29: revised; 2025-09-24: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2025/1745
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1745,
      author = {Harrison Banda and Jan Brinkmann and Juliane Krämer},
      title = {Fault Attacks on {MPCitH} Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1745},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1745}
}