Paper 2025/1714

Verifiable PIR with Small Client Storage

Mayank Rathee, University of California, Berkeley
Keewoo Lee, University of California, Berkeley
Raluca Ada Popa, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract

Efficient Verifiable Private Information Retrieval (vPIR) protocols, and more generally Verifiable Linearly Homomorphic Encryption (vLHE), suffer from high client storage. VeriSimplePIR (USENIX Security 2024), the state-of-the-art vPIR protocol, requires clients to persistently maintain over 1 GiB of local storage to privately access an 8 GiB remote database. We present a new vPIR protocol that reduces the client state by orders of magnitude while preserving online latency. In our protocol, clients only need to store 512 KiB for an 8 GiB database, achieving a 2000× improvement. Our vPIR protocol is built over our new vLHE scheme. Unlike VeriSimplePIR, our scheme doesn’t use random oracles and relies only on standard lattice assumptions - (R)LWE and SIS. These improvements come at a 2.5× cost in server throughput over VeriSimplePIR. Despite this throughput overhead, we achieve a comparable online latency to VeriSimplePIR by implementing several optimizations including query-level preprocessing. We also introduce the notion of covert vPIR (cvPIR), where stateful clients enjoy full vPIR security, while even stateless clients benefit from covert security against a malicious server.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. IEEE S&P 2026
Keywords
Homomorphic EncryptionPIRLHEVerifiable PIRMalicious SecurityCovert Security
Contact author(s)
mayankr @ berkeley edu
keewoo lee @ berkeley edu
raluca popa @ berkeley edu
History
2025-09-27: revised
2025-09-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1714
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1714,
      author = {Mayank Rathee and Keewoo Lee and Raluca Ada Popa},
      title = {Verifiable {PIR} with Small Client Storage},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1714},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1714}
}
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