Paper 2025/1627
IND-CPA-D of Relaxed Functional Bootstrapping: A New Attack, A General Fix, and A Stronger Model
Abstract
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a powerful and widely used primitive in lots of real-world applications, with IND-CPA as its standard security guarantee. Recently, Li and Micciancio [Eurocrypt'21] introduced IND-CPA-D security, which strengthens the standard IND-CPA security by allowing the attacker to access a decryption oracle for honestly generated ciphertexts (generated via either an encryption oracle or an honest homomorphic circuit evaluation process). Recently, Cheon et al. [CCS'24] and Checri et al. [Crypto'24] have shown that even exact FHE schemes like FHEW/TFHE/BGV/BFV may still not be IND-CPA-D secure, by exploiting the bootstrapping failure. However, such existing attacks can be mitigated by setting negligible bootstrapping failure probability. On the other hand, Liu and Wang [Asiacrypt'24] proposed relaxed functional bootstrapping, which has orders of magnitude performance improvement and furthermore allows a free function evaluation during bootstrapping. These efficiency advantages make it a competitive choice in many applications but its ``relaxed'' nature also opens new directions of IND-CPA-D attack. In this work, we show that the underlying secret key could be recovered within 10 minutes against all existing relaxed functional bootstrapping constructions, and even within 1 minute for some of them. Moreover, our attack works even with a negligible bootstrapping failure probability, making it immune to existing mitigation methods. Additionally, we propose a general fix that mitigates all the existing modulus-switching-error-based attacks, including ours, in the IND-CPA-D model. This is achieved by constructing a new modulus switching procedure with essentially no overhead. Lastly, we show that IND-CPA-D may not be sufficient for some applications, even in the passive adversary model. Thus, we extend this model to IND-CPA-D with randomness (IND-CPA-DR).
Note: Fixed a typo in the abstract.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CCS 2025
- Keywords
- Fully homomorphic encryptionIND-CPA-D security
- Contact author(s)
-
zeyu liu @ yale edu
yunhao wang @ yale edu
ben fisch @ yale edu - History
- 2026-04-19: last of 2 revisions
- 2025-09-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1627
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1627,
author = {Zeyu Liu and Yunhao Wang and Ben Fisch},
title = {{IND}-{CPA}-D of Relaxed Functional Bootstrapping: A New Attack, A General Fix, and A Stronger Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1627},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1627}
}