Paper 2025/1619
Generic Anonymity Wrapper for Messaging Protocols
Abstract
Modern messengers use advanced end-to-end encryption protocols to protect message content even if user secrets are ever temporarily exposed. Yet, encryption alone does not prevent user tracking, as protocols often attach metadata, such as sequence numbers, public keys, or even plain user identifiers. This metadata reveals the social network as well as communication patterns between users. Existing protocols that hide metadata in Signal (i.e., Sealed Sender), for MLS-like constructions (Hashimoto et al., CCS 2022), or in mesh networks (Bienstock et al., CCS 2023) are relatively inefficient or specially tailored for only particular settings. Moreover, all existing practical solutions reveal crucial metadata upon exposures of user secrets. In this work, we introduce a formal definition of Anonymity Wrappers (AW) that generically hide metadata of underlying two-party and group messaging protocols. Our definition captures forward and post-compromise anonymity as well as authenticity in the presence of temporary state exposures. Inspired by prior wrapper designs, the idea of our provably secure AW construction is to use shared keys of the underlying wrapped (group) messaging protocols to derive and continuously update symmetric keys for hiding metadata. Beyond hiding metadata on the wire, we also avoid and hide structural metadata in users' local states for stronger anonymity upon their exposure. We implement our construction, evaluate its performance, and provide a detailed comparison with Signal's current approach based on Sealed Sender: Our construction reduces the wire size of small 1:1 messages from 441 bytes to 114 bytes. For a group of 100 members, it reduces the wire size of outgoing group messages from 7240 bytes to 155 bytes. We see similar improvements in computation time for encryption and decryption, but these improvements come with substantial storage costs for receivers. For this reason, we develop extensions with a Bloom filter for compressing the receiver storage. Based on this, Signal considers deploying our solution.
Note: Includes disclaimer
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS 2025
- DOI
- 10.1145/3719027.3765186
- Keywords
- Secure MessagingAnonymityPrivacySealed SenderDouble RatchetSender KeyGeneric WrapperForward Security
- Contact author(s)
-
lea thiemt @ fau de
paul roesler @ fau de
alex bienstock @ jpmchase com
rolfe @ signal org
dodis @ cs nyu edu - History
- 2025-11-19: last of 2 revisions
- 2025-09-08: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1619
- License
-
CC BY-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1619,
author = {Lea Thiemt and Paul Rösler and Alexander Bienstock and Rolfe Schmidt and Yevgeniy Dodis},
title = {Generic Anonymity Wrapper for Messaging Protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1619},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1145/3719027.3765186},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1619}
}