Adaptive Attack on Static POKÉ Keys

David Lim; Yan Bo Ti

Paper 2025/1541

Adaptive Attack on Static POKÉ Keys

David Lim, DSO National Laboratories, National University of Singapore

Yan Bo Ti

, DSO National Laboratories, National University of Singapore

Abstract

Isogeny-based cryptosystems continue to show promise in post-quantum cryptography. In recent years, numerous constructions have been proposed, one of which is POKÉ, a compact and efficient public-key exchange system that uses higher-dimensional isogenies. This paper leverages a well-known adaptive attack on SIDH by Galbrath, Petit, Shani and Ti, and demonstrates a similar attack on POKÉ, when given a key exchange oracle with the same assumptions as those posed by Galbraith et al. This attack relies on the user to employ long-term static keys which is against the intent of the designers of POKÉ. Indeed, this attack provides further evidence that POKÉ should not be used with a long-term static key.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: public key cryptography post quantum cryptography cryptanalysis adaptive attack isogeny-based cryptography
Contact author(s): davidlimkangwei0710 @ gmail com
yanbo ti @ gmail com
History: 2025-08-30: approved; 2025-08-28: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2025/1541
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1541,
      author = {David Lim and Yan Bo Ti},
      title = {Adaptive Attack on Static {POKÉ} Keys},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1541},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1541}
}