Paper 2025/1530
PolySys: an Algebraic Leakage Attack Engine
Abstract
In this work, we propose a novel framework called PolySys for modeling and designing leakage attacks as constraint-solving algorithms over polynomial systems. PolySys formalizes the design of attacks using invertible encodings, structural and leakage equations, and efficient constraint-solving algorithms including SAT and constraint solvers. It is capable of modeling resolution, known-data, and inference attacks for common leakage patterns. To demonstrate the practicality of our framework, we implement a PolySys attack engine in Python and apply it to state-of-the-art query recovery, data resolution, and query inference attacks on point and range multi-maps. Our results show that PolySys outperforms all existing attacks under identical assumptions, achieving up to 60× higher recovery rates in some scenarios. While scalability remains a challenge for larger datasets, PolySys represents a promising step toward a general-purpose framework for designing leakage attacks. We believe future work can further enhance its efficiency to scale to larger and more complex workloads.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
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PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. USENIX 2025
- Contact author(s)
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zachary espiritu @ mongodb com
seny kamara @ mongodb com
tarik moataz @ mongodb com
andrew park @ mongodb com - History
- 2025-08-30: approved
- 2025-08-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1530
- License
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CC BY-NC-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1530,
author = {Zachary Espiritu and Seny Kamara and Tarik Moataz and Andrew Park},
title = {{PolySys}: an Algebraic Leakage Attack Engine},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1530},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1530}
}