Paper 2025/1530

PolySys: an Algebraic Leakage Attack Engine

Zachary Espiritu, MongoDB Research
Seny Kamara, MongoDB Research
Tarik Moataz, MongoDB Research
Andrew Park, MongoDB Research, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract

In this work, we propose a novel framework called PolySys for modeling and designing leakage attacks as constraint-solving algorithms over polynomial systems. PolySys formalizes the design of attacks using invertible encodings, structural and leakage equations, and efficient constraint-solving algorithms including SAT and constraint solvers. It is capable of modeling resolution, known-data, and inference attacks for common leakage patterns. To demonstrate the practicality of our framework, we implement a PolySys attack engine in Python and apply it to state-of-the-art query recovery, data resolution, and query inference attacks on point and range multi-maps. Our results show that PolySys outperforms all existing attacks under identical assumptions, achieving up to 60× higher recovery rates in some scenarios. While scalability remains a challenge for larger datasets, PolySys represents a promising step toward a general-purpose framework for designing leakage attacks. We believe future work can further enhance its efficiency to scale to larger and more complex workloads.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. USENIX 2025
Contact author(s)
zachary espiritu @ mongodb com
seny kamara @ mongodb com
tarik moataz @ mongodb com
andrew park @ mongodb com
History
2025-08-30: approved
2025-08-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1530
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
CC BY-NC-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1530,
      author = {Zachary Espiritu and Seny Kamara and Tarik Moataz and Andrew Park},
      title = {{PolySys}: an Algebraic Leakage Attack Engine},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1530},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1530}
}
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