Paper 2025/1459
Not in The Prophecies: Practical Attacks on Nostr
Abstract
Distributed social networking services (SNSs) recently received significant attention as an alternative to traditional, centralized SNSs, which have inherent limitations on user privacy and freedom. We provide the first in-depth security analysis of Nostr, an open-source, distributed SNS protocol developed in 2019 with more than 1.1 million registered users. We investigate the specification of Nostr and the client implementations and present a number of practical attacks allowing forgeries on various objects, such as encrypted direct messages (DMs), by a malicious user or a malicious server. Even more, we show a confidentiality attack against encrypted DMs by a malicious user exploiting a flaw in the link preview mechanism and the CBC malleability. Our attacks are due to cryptographic flaws in the protocol specification and client implementation, some of which in combination elevate the forgery attack to a violation of confidentiality. We verify the practicality of our attacks via Proof-of-Concept implementations and discuss how to mitigate them.
Note: Website : https://crypto-sec-n.github.io/
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. 10th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P 2025)
- Keywords
- Nostrplaintext recovery attackforgery attackkey replace attackCache‐based Forgery AttackCBC-mode
- Contact author(s)
-
hytkimura @ protonmail com
itorym @ nict go jp
k-minematsu @ nec com
4w3tag185mpja @ gmail com
takanori isobe @ ist osaka-u ac jp - History
- 2025-08-13: approved
- 2025-08-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1459
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1459,
author = {Hayato Kimura and Ryoma Ito and Kazuhiko Minematsu and Shogo Shiraki and Takanori Isobe},
title = {Not in The Prophecies: Practical Attacks on Nostr},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1459},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1459}
}