Paper 2025/1376

On Hull Attacks on the Module Lattice Isomorphism Problem

Franciele C. Silva, State University of Campinas
Maja Lie, Imperial College London
Cong Ling, Imperial College London
Abstract

The Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) is a relatively recent cryptographic assumption whose precise hardness remains not fully understood. Certain weak instances have been identified through hull attacks on $p$-ary lattices constructed via Construction A using linear codes with trivial hulls. In this work, we generalize the notion of the hull by introducing ideal-based hulls for Hermitian lattices. We propose a new hull attack targeting lattices derived from Generalized Construction A over number fields, under specific structural conditions. Furthermore, we show that modular lattices offer intrinsic resistance to hull attacks: the hull introduces only a limited variation in the lattice gap, bounded by a factor depending on the root discriminant of the number field. In particular, for modular $\mathbb{Z}$-lattices, the hull gap coincides exactly with the original lattice gap. As a concrete example, we show that the family of Barnes-Wall lattices, which are alternatively unimodular and 2-modular over $\mathbb{Z}$, are resistant to hull attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Generalised Construction AHermitian formsLattice Isomorphism Problemmodular latticehull attack.
Contact author(s)
francielecs @ ime unicamp br
m lie22 @ imperial ac uk
c ling @ imperial ac uk
History
2025-07-30: approved
2025-07-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1376
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1376,
      author = {Franciele C. Silva and Maja Lie and Cong Ling},
      title = {On Hull Attacks on the Module Lattice Isomorphism Problem},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1376},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1376}
}
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