Paper 2025/1232
OMIX: Offline Mixing for Scalable Self-Tallying Elections
Abstract
In electronic voting systems, guaranteeing voter anonymity is essential. One primary method to ensure this is the use of a mix-net, in which a set of mix-servers sequentially shuffle a set of encrypted votes, and generate proofs that a correct permutation has been applied. Whilst mix-nets offer advantages over alternative approaches, their traditional use during the tallying phase introduces a significant robustness bottleneck: the process is inherently sequential and critically depends on trusted authorities to perform shuffling and decryption. Any disruption can prevent the final result from being revealed. In this work, we propose offline mixing OMIX, the first voting framework to support a mix-net-based system in which trustees never handle encrypted votes, while also ensuring that each voter's cost is independent of the total number of voters. In particular, the contributions of permutations by mix-servers and decryption shares by trustees are completed and publicly verified before any vote is cast. This eliminates the need for their participation during tallying and enables the first scalable, mix-net-based, and self-tallying voting protocol in the sense of Kiayias and Yung (PKC'02). At the core of OMIX is a distributed key-generation mechanism: each voter locally generates a private voting key and registers a constant-size set of basis public keys. These are permuted and partially decrypted in an offline phase, resulting in a final public decryption key that reveals votes in shuffled order. Our construction leverages the homomorphic and structure-preserving properties of function-hiding inner-product functional encryption, combined with standard primitives, to achieve self-tallying, client scalability, ballot privacy and other voting properties. To support the new mixing structure introduced by OMIX, we also develop a compact and verifiable offline mix-net, based on an enhanced linearly homomorphic signature scheme. This latter primitive may be of independent interest.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- votingmix-netself-tallyingclient-scalablefunctional encryptionlinearly-homomorphic signature
- Contact author(s)
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sebastien canard @ telecom-paris fr
liam medley @ telecom-paris fr
dinh nguyen @ telecom-paris fr
hieu phan @ telecom-paris fr - History
- 2025-07-09: approved
- 2025-07-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1232
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1232,
author = {Sébastien Canard and Liam Medley and Duy Nguyen and Duong Hieu Phan},
title = {{OMIX}: Offline Mixing for Scalable Self-Tallying Elections},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1232},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1232}
}