SoK: Reassessing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in PQC Implementations

Patrik Dobias; Azade Rezaeezade; Łukasz Chmielewski; Lukas Malina; Lejla Batina

Paper 2025/1222

SoK: Reassessing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in PQC Implementations

Patrik Dobias, Brno University of Technology, Brno, Czech Republic

Azade Rezaeezade, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

Łukasz Chmielewski, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Lukas Malina, Brno University of Technology, Brno, Czech Republic

Lejla Batina, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Abstract

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms should remain secure even in the presence of quantum computers. Although the security of such schemes is guaranteed at the algorithmic level, real-world implementations often suffer from other vulnerabilities like Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper investigates side-channel attacks targeting implementations of PQC algorithms. This work categorizes attacks from an adversarial perspective to identify the most vulnerable components of the algorithms' implementations and highlights unexplored parts in current implementations. In addition, it reviews and analyzes the efficiency and efficacy of existing countermeasures to SCA in current hardware implementations. This approach helps identify countermeasures that provide broader protection and highlights characteristics needed for future secure implementations. Our findings offer guidance in strengthening existing systems and developing more efficient defenses against side-channel attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Side-channel Attacks Post-Quantum Cryptography Countermeasures
Contact author(s): xdobia13 @ vut cz
a rezaeezade-1 @ tudelft nl
chmiel @ fi muni cz
malina @ vut cz
lejla @ cs ru nl
History: 2025-07-07: approved; 2025-06-30: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2025/1222
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1222,
      author = {Patrik Dobias and Azade Rezaeezade and Łukasz Chmielewski and Lukas Malina and Lejla Batina},
      title = {{SoK}: Reassessing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in {PQC} Implementations},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1222},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1222}
}