Paper 2025/119
SoK: PQC PAKEs - Design, Security and Performance
Abstract
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) establishes secure communication channels using passwords for authentication. Currently, standardized PAKEs rely on classical asymmetric cryptography. However, these PAKEs may become insecure should the expected quantum threat become a reality. Despite the growing interest in realizing quantum-safe PAKEs, they did not receive much attention from the ongoing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) integration efforts. Hence, there is a significant awareness gap compared to PQC primitives subject to the official standardization processes. We provide a comprehensive overview of existing PQC PAKEs, classify their design rationales and authentication methods, and address aspects related to their security and performance. We identify PAKE designs that are still unexplored in the PQC realm and discuss the possibility of their adaptation. Thus, we offer a detailed reference for future work on PQC PAKEs.
Note: Updated title and author affiliations. Major Revision into Long Paper. Added new references and updated published eprints.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Systematization of KnowledgePassword Authenticated Key ExchangePost-Quantum CryptographyPublic-Key Cryptography
- Contact author(s)
-
nouri alnahawi @ h-da de
david haas1 @ stud tu-darmstadt de
erik mauss @ stud h-da de
alexander wiesmaier @ h-da de - History
- 2025-10-20: last of 7 revisions
- 2025-01-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/119
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/119,
author = {Nouri Alnahawi and David Haas and Erik Mauß and Alexander Wiesmaier},
title = {{SoK}: {PQC} {PAKEs} - Design, Security and Performance},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/119},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/119}
}
