Paper 2025/119

SoK: PQC PAKEs - Cryptographic Primitives, Design and Security

Nouri Alnahawi, Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences
David Haas, TU Darmstadt
Erik Mauß, Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences
Alexander Wiesmaier, Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences
Abstract

PAKE protocols are used to establish secure communication channels using a relatively short, often human memorable, password for authentication. The currently standardized PAKEs however rely on classical asymmetric (public key) cryptography. Thus, these classical PAKEs may no longer maintain their security, should the expected quantum threat become a reality. Unlike prominent security protocols such as TLS, IKEv2 and VPN, quantum-safe PAKEs did not receive much attention from the ongoing PQC integration efforts. Thus, there is a significant gap in awareness compared to PQC schemes that are subject to the official governmental and institutional standardization processes. In the work at hand, we provide a comprehensive overview of the existing PQC PAKEs focusing on their design rationales, authentication methods and used asymmetric key agreement primitives. We highlight their performance and properties as per their assumed security assurances and practical usage in applications. Moreover, we address PAKE designs that are still non-present in the PQC realm and discuss the possibility of their adaptation. Thus, we offer a detailed reference and derive future work for quantum-safe PAKEs.

Note: Updated author affiliations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Systematization of KnowledgePassword Authenticated Key ExchangePost-Quantum CryptographyPublic-Key Cryptography
Contact author(s)
nouri alnahawi @ h-da de
david haas1 @ stud tu-darmstadt de
erik mauss @ stud h-da de
alexander wiesmaier @ h-da de
History
2025-02-15: last of 4 revisions
2025-01-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/119
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/119,
      author = {Nouri Alnahawi and David Haas and Erik Mauß and Alexander Wiesmaier},
      title = {{SoK}: {PQC} {PAKEs} - Cryptographic Primitives, Design and Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/119},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/119}
}
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