Paper 2025/1166

Threshold Signatures Reloaded: ML-DSA and Enhanced Raccoon with Identifiable Aborts

Giacomo Borin, IBM Research Europe, University of Zurich
Sofía Celi, Brave Research, University of Bristol
Rafael del Pino, PQShield
Thomas Espitau, PQShield
Guilhem Niot, PQShield, Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA
Thomas Prest, PQShield
Abstract

Threshold signatures enable multiple participants to collaboratively produce a digital signature, ensuring both fault tolerance and decentralization. As we transition to the post-quantum era, lattice-based threshold constructions have emerged as promising candidates. However, existing approaches often struggle to scale efficiently, lack robustness guarantees, or are incompatible with standard schemes — most notably, the NIST-standard ML-DSA. In this work, we explore the design space of Fiat-Shamir-based lattice threshold signatures and introduce the two most practical schemes to date. First, we present an enhanced TRaccoon-based [DKM+24] construction that supports up to 64 participants with identifiable aborts, leveraging novel short secret-sharing techniques to achieve greater scalability than previous state-of-the-art methods. Second — and most importantly — we propose the first practical ML-DSA-compatible threshold signature scheme, supporting up to 6 users. We provide full implementations and benchmarks of our schemes, demonstrating their practicality and efficiency for real-world deployment as protocol messages are computed in at most a few milliseconds, and communication cost ranges from 10.5 kB to 525 kB depending on the threshold.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Threshold ML-DSAML-DSADilithiumthreshold cryptographyshort secret sharingRaccoonThreshold Raccoon
Contact author(s)
Giacomo Borin @ ibm com
soficeli0 @ gmail com
rafael del pino @ pqshield com
thomas espitau @ pqshield com
guilhem @ gniot fr
thomas prest @ pqshield com
History
2025-06-20: approved
2025-06-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1166
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1166,
      author = {Giacomo Borin and Sofía Celi and Rafael del Pino and Thomas Espitau and Guilhem Niot and Thomas Prest},
      title = {Threshold Signatures Reloaded: {ML}-{DSA} and Enhanced Raccoon with Identifiable Aborts},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1166},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1166}
}
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