Paper 2025/1139

From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus

Jovan Komatovic, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)
Andrew Lewis-Pye, London School of Economics (LSE)
Joachim Neu, a16z Crypto Research
Tim Roughgarden, Columbia University, a16z Crypto Research
Ertem Nusret Tas, Stanford University
Abstract

This paper presents the first generic compiler that transforms any permissioned consensus protocol into a proof-of-stake permissionless consensus protocol. For each of the following properties, if the initial permissioned protocol satisfies that property in the partially synchronous setting, the consequent proof-of-stake protocol also satisfies that property in the partially synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting (with the same fault-tolerance): consistency; liveness; optimistic responsiveness; every composable log-specific property; and message complexity of a given order. Moreover, our transformation ensures that the output protocol satisfies accountability (identifying culprits in the event of a consistency violation), whether or not the original permissioned protocol satisfied it.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)
DOI
10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21
Contact author(s)
jovan komatovic @ epfl ch
a lewis7 @ lse ac uk
jneu @ a16z com
tim roughgarden @ gmail com
nusret @ stanford edu
History
2025-08-10: revised
2025-06-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1139
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1139,
      author = {Jovan Komatovic and Andrew Lewis-Pye and Joachim Neu and Tim Roughgarden and Ertem Nusret Tas},
      title = {From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1139},
      year = {2025},
      doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1139}
}
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