Paper 2025/1060

Uniform Black-Box Separations via Non-Malleable Extractors

Marshall Ball, New York University
Dana Dachman-Soled, University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract

We construct $t$-non-malleable extractors---which allow an attacker to tamper with a source $t$ times---for high min-entropy sources samplable by poly-time hierarchy circuits and for tampering classes corresponding to poly-time hierarchy functions from derandomization-type assumptions. We then show an application of this new object to ruling out constructions of succinct, non-interactive, arguments (SNARGs) secure against \emph{uniform} adversaries from \emph{uniform} falsifiable assumptions via a class of black-box reductions that has not been previously considered in the literature. This class of black-box reductions allows the reduction to arbitrarily set the \emph{coins}, as well as the input, of the uniform adversary it interacts with. The class of reductions we consider is restricted in allowing only non-adaptive queries to the adversary.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. CRYPTO 2025
Keywords
non-malleable extractorsblack-box separationsSNARGssamplable distributionssamplable sourcesderandomization
Contact author(s)
marshall @ cs nyu edu
danadach @ umd edu
History
2025-06-09: approved
2025-06-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1060
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1060,
      author = {Marshall Ball and Dana Dachman-Soled},
      title = {Uniform Black-Box Separations via Non-Malleable Extractors},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1060},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1060}
}
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