Paper 2024/863
Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms
Abstract
This paper explores the problem of preventing length leakage in oblivious data access mechanisms with passive persistent adversaries. We show that designing mechanisms that prevent both length leakage and access pattern leakage requires navigating a three-way tradeoff between storage footprint, bandwidth footprint, and the information leaked to the adversary. We establish powerful lower bounds on achievable storage and bandwidth footprints for a variety of leakage profiles, and present constructions that perfectly or near-perfectly match the lower bounds.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. USENIX Security
- Contact author(s)
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grace jia @ yale edu
ragarwal @ cs cornell edu
anurag khandelwal @ yale edu - History
- 2024-06-13: revised
- 2024-05-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/863
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/863,
author = {Grace Jia and Rachit Agarwal and Anurag Khandelwal},
title = {Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/863},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/863}
}
