Paper 2024/754

Adversary Resilient Learned Bloom Filters

Allison Bishop, City College of New York, Proof Trading
Hayder Tirmazi, City College of New York
Abstract

Creating an adversary resilient construction of the Learned Bloom Filter with provable guarantees is an open problem. We define a strong adversarial model for the Learned Bloom Filter. Our adversarial model extends an existing adversarial model designed for the Classical (i.e not ``Learned'') Bloom Filter by prior work and considers computationally bounded adversaries that run in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT). Using our model, we construct an adversary resilient variant of the Learned Bloom Filter called the Downtown Bodega Filter. We show that: if pseudo-random permutations exist, then an Adversary Resilient Learned Bloom Filter may be constructed with $2\lambda$ extra bits of memory and at most one extra pseudo-random permutation in the critical path. We construct a hybrid adversarial model for the case where a fraction of the query workload is chosen by an adversary. We show realistic scenarios where using the Downtown Bodega Filter gives better performance guarantees compared to alternative approaches in this hybrid model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Pseudorandom PermutationsAdversarial Artificial IntelligenceProbabilistic Data Structures
Contact author(s)
abishop @ ccny cuny edu
hayder research @ gmail com
History
2024-10-14: last of 4 revisions
2024-05-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/754
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/754,
      author = {Allison Bishop and Hayder Tirmazi},
      title = {Adversary Resilient Learned Bloom Filters},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/754},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/754}
}
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