Paper 2024/709
Masked Computation the Floor Function and its Application to the FALCON Signature
Abstract
FALCON is candidate for standardization of the new Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) primitives by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, it remains a challenge to define efficient countermeasures against side-channel attacks (SCA) for this algorithm. FALCON is a lattice-based signature that relies on rational numbers which is unusual in the cryptography field. While recent work proposed a solution to mask the addition and the multiplication, some roadblocks remain, most noticeably how to protect the floor function. We propose in this work to complete the existing first trials of hardening FALCON against SCA. We perform the mathematical proofs of our methods as well as formal security proof in the probing model using the Non-Interference concepts.
Note: Revision 1 : Changed the paper structure for clarity and added the performances of a complete masked FALCON
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Floor FunctionFloating-Point ArithmeticPost-Quantum CryptographyFALCONSide-Channel AnalysisMasking
- Contact author(s)
-
berthet @ telecom-paris fr
justine paillet @ univ-st-etienne fr
cedric tavernier @ hensoldt net - History
- 2024-09-12: revised
- 2024-05-08: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/709
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/709, author = {Pierre-Augustin Berthet and Justine Paillet and Cédric Tavernier}, title = {Masked Computation the Floor Function and its Application to the {FALCON} Signature}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/709}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/709} }