Paper 2024/681

HRA-Secure Homomorphic Lattice-Based Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight Security

Aloni Cohen, University of Chicago
David Bruce Cousins, Duality Technologies Inc.
Nicholas Genise, Apple (United States)
Erik Kline, University of Southern California/Information Sciences Institute
Yuriy Polyakov, Duality Technologies Inc.
Saraswathy RV
Abstract

We construct an efficient proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme secure against honest re-encryption attacks (HRA-secure) with precise concrete security estimates. To get these precise concrete security estimates, we introduce the tight, fine-grained noise-flooding techniques of Li et al. (CRYPTO'22) to RLWE-based (homomorphic) PRE schemes, as well as a mixed statistical-computational security to HRA security analysis. Our solution also supports homomorphic operations on the ciphertexts. Such homomorphism allows for advanced applications, e.g., encrypted computation of network statistics across networks and unlimited hops, in the case of full homomorphism, i.e., bootstrapping. We implement our PRE scheme in the OpenFHE software library and apply it to a problem of secure multi-hop data distribution in the context of 5G virtual network slices. We also experimentally evaluate the performance of our scheme, demonstrating that the implementation is practical. In addition, we compare our PRE method with other lattice-based PRE schemes and approaches to achieve HRA security. These achieve HRA security, but not in a tight, practical scheme such as our work. Further, we present an attack on the PRE scheme proposed in Davidson et al.'s (ACISP'19), which was claimed to achieve HRA security without noise flooding.

Note: Updated the experimental results

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Lattice-Based Proxy Re-EncryptionFully Homomorphic EncryptionHRA Security
Contact author(s)
dcousins @ dualitytech com
ypolyakov @ dualitytech com
History
2024-07-10: revised
2024-05-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/681
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/681,
      author = {Aloni Cohen and David Bruce Cousins and Nicholas Genise and Erik Kline and Yuriy Polyakov and Saraswathy RV},
      title = {{HRA}-Secure Homomorphic Lattice-Based Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/681},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/681}
}
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