Paper 2024/676

Composing Timed Cryptographic Protocols: Foundations and Applications

Karim Eldefrawy, SRI International
Benjamin Terner, Confidencial
Moti Yung, Google (United States) and Columbia University
Abstract

Time-lock puzzles are unique cryptographic primitives that use computational complexity to keep information secret for some period of time, after which security expires. Unfortunately, twenty-five years after their introduction, current analysis techniques of time-lock primitives provide no sound mechanism to build multi-party cryptographic protocols which use expiring security as a building block. As pointed out recently in the peer-reviewed literature, current attempts at this problem lack either composability, a fully consistent analysis, or functionality. This paper presents a new complexity theoretic based framework and new structural theorems to analyze timed primitives with full generality and in composition (which is the central modular protocol design tool). The framework includes a model of security based on fine-grained circuit complexity which we call ``residual complexity,'' which accounts for possible leakage on timed primitives as they expire. Our definitions for multi-party computation protocols generalize the literature standards by accounting for fine-grained polynomial circuit depth to model computational hardness which expires in feasible time. Our composition theorems, in turn, incur degradation of (fine-grained) security as items are composed. In our framework, simulators are given a polynomial ``budget" for computational depth, and in composition these polynomials interact. Finally, we demonstrate via a prototypical auction application how to apply our framework and theorems. For the first time, we show that it is possible to prove -- in a way that is fully consistent, with falsifiable assumptions -- properties of multi-party applications based on leaky, temporarily secure components. This work therefore significantly extends provable cryptography down from the self-contained world of arbitrary-polynomial security to the realm of small time domains which often appear in practice, where security of components expires while the larger system remains secure.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
multiparty computationtime-lock puzzlefine grained
Contact author(s)
eldefrawy @ gmail com
benjaminterner @ gmail com
motiyung @ gmail com
History
2024-10-15: revised
2024-05-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/676
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/676,
      author = {Karim Eldefrawy and Benjamin Terner and Moti Yung},
      title = {Composing Timed Cryptographic Protocols: Foundations and Applications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/676},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/676}
}
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