Paper 2024/658
Information-theoretic security with asymmetries
Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of lower bounding any given cost function depending on the false positive and false negative probabilities of adversaries against indistinguishability security notions in symmetric-key cryptography. We take the cost model as an input, so that this becomes a purely information-theoretical question. We propose power bounds as an easy-to-use alternative for advantage bounds in the context of indistinguishability with asymmetric cost functions. We show that standard proof techniques such as hybrid arguments and the H-coefficient method can be generalized to the power model, and apply these techniques to the PRP-PRF switching lemma, the Even-Mansour (EM) construction, and the sum-of-permutations (SoP) construction. As the final and perhaps most useful contribution, we provide two methods to convert single-user power bounds into multi-user power bounds, and investigate their relation to the point-wise proximity method of Hoang and Tessaro (Crypto 2016). These method are applied to obtain tight multi-user power bounds for EM and SoP.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in CRYPTO 2024
- Keywords
- Information theoretic securityAsymmetrical statistical costsPower boundsMulti-user security
- Contact author(s)
-
tim beyne @ esat kuleuven be
yulong chen @ esat kuleuven be - History
- 2024-06-07: revised
- 2024-04-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/658
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/658, author = {Tim Beyne and Yu Long Chen}, title = {Information-theoretic security with asymmetries}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/658}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/658} }