Paper 2024/615

Subverting Cryptographic Protocols from A Fine-Grained Perspective - A Case Study on 2-Party ECDSA

Jialiu Cheng, National University of Defense Technology
Yi Wang, National University of Defense Technology
Rongmao Chen, National University of Defense Technology
Xinyi Huang, Jinan University
Abstract

The revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 rekindled concerns within the cryptographic community regarding the potential subversion of cryptographic systems. Bellare et al. (CRYPTO'14) introduced the notion of Algorithm Substitution Attacks (ASAs), which aim to covertly leak sensitive information by undermining individual cryptographic primitives. In this work, we delve deeply into the realm of ASAs against protocols built upon cryptographic primitives. In particular, we revisit the existing ASA model proposed by Berndt et al. (AsiaCCS'22), providing a more fine-grained perspective. We introduce a novel ASA model tailored for protocols, capable of capturing a wide spectrum of subversion attacks. Our model features a modular representation of subverted parties within protocols, along with fine-grained definitions of undetectability. To illustrate the practicality of our model, we applied it to Lindell's two-party ECDSA protocol (CRYPTO'17), unveiling a range of ASAs targeting the protocol's parties with the objective of extracting secret key shares. Our work offers a comprehensive ASA model suited to cryptographic protocols, providing a useful framework for understanding ASAs against protocols.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACISP 2024
Keywords
Algorithm Substitution AttackCryptographic Protocol2-Party ECDSA
Contact author(s)
jialiuamy @ gmail com
wangyi14 @ nudt edu cn
chromao @ nudt edu cn
xyhuang81 @ gmail com
History
2024-04-26: approved
2024-04-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/615
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/615,
      author = {Jialiu Cheng and Yi Wang and Rongmao Chen and Xinyi Huang},
      title = {Subverting Cryptographic Protocols from A Fine-Grained Perspective - A Case Study on 2-Party {ECDSA}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/615},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/615}
}
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