Paper 2024/536

Highly-Effective Backdoors for Hash Functions and Beyond

Mihir Bellare, University of California San Diego
Doreen Riepel, University of California San Diego
Laura Shea, University of California San Diego
Abstract

We study the possibility of schemes whose public parameters have been generated along with a backdoor. We consider the goal of the big-brother adversary to be two-fold: It desires utility (it can break the scheme) but also exclusivity (nobody else can). Starting with hash functions, we give new, strong definitions for these two goals, calling the combination high effectiveness. We then present a construction of a backdoored hash function that is highly effective, meaning provably meets our new definition. As an application, we investigate forgery of X.509 certificates that use this hash function. We then consider signatures, again giving a definition of high effectiveness, and showing that it can be achieved. But we also give some positive results, namely that for the Okamoto and Katz-Wang signature schemes, certain natural backdoor strategies are provably futile. Our backdoored constructions serve to warn that backdoors can be more powerful and damaging than previously conceived, and to help defenders and developers identify potential backdoors by illustrating how they might be built. Our positive results illustrate that some schemes do offer more backdoor resistance than others, which may make them preferable.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
subversionhash functionschameleon hash functionssignaturesOkamoto signatures
Contact author(s)
mbellare @ ucsd edu
driepel @ ucsd edu
lmshea @ ucsd edu
History
2024-04-18: revised
2024-04-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/536
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/536,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Doreen Riepel and Laura Shea},
      title = {Highly-Effective Backdoors for Hash Functions and Beyond},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/536},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/536}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/536}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.