Paper 2024/500
Side Channel Resistant Sphincs+
Abstract
Here is a potential way to create a SLH-DSA-like\cite{DraftFIPS205} key generation/signer that aspires to be resistant to DPA side channel attacks. We say that it is “SLH-DSA-like”, because it does not follow the FIPS 205 method of generating signatures (in particular, it does not have the same mapping from private key, messages, opt\_rand to signatures), however it does generate public keys and signatures that are compatible with the standard signature verification method, and with the same security (with a small security loss against side channel attacks). In our tests, this idea performed 1.7 times slower compared to an unprotected version.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- sphincs+slh-dsaside-channelhash-signature
- Contact author(s)
- sfluhrer @ cisco com
- History
- 2024-04-01: approved
- 2024-03-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/500
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/500,
author = {Scott Fluhrer},
title = {Side Channel Resistant Sphincs+},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/500},
year = {2024},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/500}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/500}
}
