Paper 2024/424
Revisiting the Security of Approximate FHE with Noise-Flooding Countermeasures
Abstract
Approximate fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes, such as the CKKS scheme (Cheon, Kim, Kim, Song, ASIACRYPT '17), are among the leading schemes in terms of efficiency and are particularly suitable for Machine Learning (ML) tasks. Although efficient, approximate FHE schemes have some inherent risks: Li and Micciancio (EUROCRYPT '21) demonstrated that while these schemes achieved the standard notion of CPA-security, they failed against a variant,
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- approximate fully homomorphic encryptionnoise-flooding countermeasureslattice reduction attack
- Contact author(s)
-
flavio @ intel com
anamaria costache @ ntnu no
danadach @ umd edu
hkippen @ umd edu
llabuff @ terpmail umd edu
ruitang @ umd edu - History
- 2024-08-06: last of 2 revisions
- 2024-03-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/424
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/424, author = {Flavio Bergamaschi and Anamaria Costache and Dana Dachman-Soled and Hunter Kippen and Lucas LaBuff and Rui Tang}, title = {Revisiting the Security of Approximate {FHE} with Noise-Flooding Countermeasures}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/424}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/424} }