Paper 2024/400

SILBE: an Updatable Public Key Encryption Scheme from Lollipop Attacks

Max Duparc, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Tako Boris Fouotsa, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Serge Vaudenay, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Abstract

We present a new post-quantum Public Key Encryption scheme (PKE) named Supersingular Isogeny Lollipop Based Encryption or SILBE. SILBE is obtained by leveraging the generalised lollipop attack of Castryck and Vercauteren on the M-SIDH Key exchange by Fouotsa, Moriya and Petit. Doing so, we can in fact make SILBE a post-quantum secure Updatable Public Key Encryption scheme (UPKE). SILBE is in fact the first isogeny-based UPKE which is not based on group actions. Hence, SILBE overcomes the limitations highlighted by Eaton, Jao, Komlo and Mokrani at SAC'21 regarding the design of an SIDH-style UPKE. This is possible by leveraging both the Deuring Correspondence and Kani's Lemma, two central concepts in Isogeny-Based Cryptography.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Selected Areas in Cryptography 2024
Keywords
Post-Quantum CryptographySupersingular IsogeniesM-SIDHGeneralized Lollipop AttacksUPKE
Contact author(s)
max duparc @ epfl ch
tako fouotsa @ epfl ch
serge vaudenay @ epfl ch
History
2024-07-31: last of 5 revisions
2024-03-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/400
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/400,
      author = {Max Duparc and Tako Boris Fouotsa and Serge Vaudenay},
      title = {{SILBE}: an Updatable Public Key Encryption Scheme from Lollipop Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/400},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/400}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.