Paper 2024/326

Haven++: Batched and Packed Dual-Threshold Asynchronous Complete Secret Sharing with Applications

Nicolas Alhaddad, Boston University
Mayank Varia, Boston University
Ziling Yang, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Abstract

Asynchronous complete secret sharing (ACSS) is a foundational primitive in the design of distributed algorithms and cryptosystems that require secrecy. Dual-threshold ACSS permits a dealer to distribute a secret to a collection of $n$ servers so that everyone holds shares of a polynomial containing the dealer's secret. This work contributes a new ACSS protocol, called Haven++, that uses packing and batching to make asymptotic and concrete advances in the design and application of ACSS for large secrets. Haven++ allows the dealer to pack multiple secrets in a single sharing phase, and to reconstruct either one or all of them later. For even larger secrets, we contribute a batching technique to amortize the cost of proof generation and verification across multiple invocations of our protocol. The result is an asymptotic improvement in amortized communication and computation complexity, both for ACSS itself and for its application to asynchronous distributed key generation. We implement Haven++ and find that it improves performance over the hbACSS protocol of Yurek et al. by a factor of 3-10$\times$ or more across a wide range of parameters for the number of parties and batch size.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
ACSSAVSSDKGAMPCADKGDual Threshold Secret SharingPacked Secret SharingBatched Secret Sharing
Contact author(s)
nhaddad @ bu edu
varia @ bu edu
zilingy2 @ illinois edu
History
2024-02-27: approved
2024-02-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/326
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/326,
      author = {Nicolas Alhaddad and Mayank Varia and Ziling Yang},
      title = {Haven++: Batched and Packed Dual-Threshold Asynchronous Complete Secret Sharing with Applications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/326},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/326}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/326}
}
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