Paper 2024/321

Formal Verification of Emulated Floating-Point Arithmetic in Falcon

Vincent Hwang, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
Abstract

We show that there is a discrepancy between the emulated floating-point multiplication in the submission package of the digital signature Falcon and the claimed behavior. In particular, we show that some floating-point products with absolute values the smallest normal positive floating-point number are incorrectly zeroized. However, we show that the discrepancy doesn’t affect the complex fast Fourier transform in the signature generation of Falcon by modeling the floating-point addition, subtraction, and multiplication in CryptoLine. We later implement our own floating-point multiplications in Armv7-M assembly and Jasmin and prove their equivalence with our model, demonstrating the possibility of transferring the challenging verification task (verifying highly-optimized assembly) to the presumably more readable code base (Jasmin).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. International Workshop on Security 2024
Keywords
FalconFloating-point arithmeticFormal verificationCryptoLine
Contact author(s)
vincentvbh7 @ gmail com
History
2024-07-22: last of 4 revisions
2024-02-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/321
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/321,
      author = {Vincent Hwang},
      title = {Formal Verification of Emulated Floating-Point Arithmetic in Falcon},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/321},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/321}
}
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