Paper 2024/283
Toward Malicious Constant-Rate 2PC via Arithmetic Garbling
Abstract
A recent work by Ball, Li, Lin, and Liu [Eurocrypt'23] presented a new instantiation of the arithmetic garbling paradigm introduced by Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [FOCS'11]. In particular, Ball et al.'s garbling scheme is the first constant-rate garbled circuit over large enough bounded integer computations, inferring the first constant-round constant-rate secure two-party computation (2PC) over bounded integer computations in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
The main source of difficulty in lifting the security of garbling schemes-based protocols to the malicious setting lies in proving the correctness of the underlying garbling scheme. In this work, we analyze the security of Ball et al.'s scheme in the presence of malicious attacks.
- We demonstrate an overflow attack, which is inevitable in this computational model, even if the garbled circuit is fully correct. Our attack follows by defining an adversary, corrupting either the garbler or the evaluator, that chooses a bad input and causes the computation to overflow, thus leaking information about the honest party's input. By utilizing overflow attacks, we show that
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2024
- Keywords
- Arithmetic GCConstant-rate 2PCMalicious security
- Contact author(s)
-
Carmit Hazay @ biu ac il
yyang811 @ gatech edu - History
- 2024-02-23: approved
- 2024-02-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/283
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/283, author = {Carmit Hazay and Yibin Yang}, title = {Toward Malicious Constant-Rate {2PC} via Arithmetic Garbling}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/283}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/283} }