Paper 2024/261
Election Eligibility with OpenID: Turning Authentication into Transferable Proof of Eligibility
Abstract
Eligibility checks are often abstracted away or omitted in voting protocols, leading to situations where the voting server can easily stuff the ballot box. One reason for this is the difficulty of bootstraping the authentication material for voters without relying on trusting the voting server. In this paper, we propose a new protocol that solves this problem by building on OpenID, a widely deployed authentication protocol. Instead of using it as a standard authentication means, we turn it into a mechanism that delivers transferable proofs of eligibility. Using zk-SNARK proofs, we show that this can be done without revealing any compromising information, in particular, protecting everlasting privacy. Our approach remains efficient and can easily be integrated into existing protocols, as we have done for the Belenios voting protocol. We provide a full-fledged proof of concept along with benchmarks showing our protocol could be realistically used in large-scale elections.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- ZKPzk-SNARKelectronic votingeligibility verifiabilityformal methodsOpenID
- Contact author(s)
-
veronique cortier @ loria fr
alexandre debant @ inria fr
anselme goetschmann @ gmail com
lucca hirschi @ inria fr - History
- 2024-02-19: approved
- 2024-02-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/261
- License
-
CC BY-NC-ND
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/261, author = {Véronique Cortier and Alexandre Debant and Anselme Goetschmann and Lucca Hirschi}, title = {Election Eligibility with {OpenID}: Turning Authentication into Transferable Proof of Eligibility}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/261}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/261} }