Paper 2024/224

Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited

Nir Bitansky, Tel Aviv University
Nathan Geier, Tel Aviv University

In an (α,β)-weak non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK), the soundness error is at most α and the zero-knowledge error is at most β. Goyal, Jain, and Sahai (CRYPTO 2019) show that if α+β<1 for some constants α,β, then (α,β)-weak NIZK can be turned into fully-secure NIZK, assuming sub-exponentially-secure public-key encryption. We revisit the problem of NIZK amplification: – We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants α+β<1. – We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants α+β<1. – When the soundness error α is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. Our results are based on the hidden-bits paradigm, and can be viewed as a reduction from NIZK amplification to the better understood problem of pseudorandomness amplification.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
NIZKAmplificationZero KnowledgeHidden Bits
Contact author(s)
nirbitan @ tau ac il
nathangeier @ mail tau ac il
2024-02-16: approved
2024-02-13: received
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      author = {Nir Bitansky and Nathan Geier},
      title = {Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/224},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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