Paper 2024/224
Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited
Abstract
In an (α,β)-weak non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK), the soundness error is at most α and the zero-knowledge error is at most β. Goyal, Jain, and Sahai (CRYPTO 2019) show that if α+β<1 for some constants α,β, then (α,β)-weak NIZK can be turned into fully-secure NIZK, assuming sub-exponentially-secure public-key encryption. We revisit the problem of NIZK amplification: – We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants α+β<1. – We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants α+β<1. – When the soundness error α is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. Our results are based on the hidden-bits paradigm, and can be viewed as a reduction from NIZK amplification to the better understood problem of pseudorandomness amplification.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- NIZKAmplificationZero KnowledgeHidden Bits
- Contact author(s)
-
nirbitan @ tau ac il
nathangeier @ mail tau ac il - History
- 2024-02-16: approved
- 2024-02-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/224
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/224, author = {Nir Bitansky and Nathan Geier}, title = {Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/224}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/224} }