Paper 2024/214

Distributed Fiat-Shamir Transform: from Threshold Identification Protocols to Signatures

Michele Battagliola, University of Trento
Andrea Flamini, University of Trento
Abstract

The recent surge of distribute technologies caused an increasing interest towards threshold signature protocols, that peaked with the recent NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes. Since its introduction, the Fiat-Shamir Transform has been the most popular way to design standard digital signature schemes. Many threshold signature schemes are designed in a way that recalls the structure of digital signatures created using Fiat Shamir, by having the signers generate a common commitment, compute the challenge as the hash of it, and then jointly create the response. In this work we formalize this approach. In particular we introduce the notion of threshold identification scheme and threshold sigma protocol. Next, we introduce the concept of generalized Fiat-Shamir transform, that links the security of the threshold signature with the underlying threshold identification protocol. Our framework seeks to be an alternative, easier way to design concurrently secure threshold digital signatures and we show its potentiality providing an alternative security proof for Sparkle, a recent threshold Schnorr signature, and GRASS, a full threshold signature based on cryptographic group actions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Threshold SignatureFiat-Shamir TransformThreshold Identification Schemes
Contact author(s)
michele battagliola @ unitn it
andrea flamini @ unitn it
History
2024-06-13: last of 3 revisions
2024-02-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/214
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/214,
      author = {Michele Battagliola and Andrea Flamini},
      title = {Distributed Fiat-Shamir Transform: from Threshold Identification Protocols to Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/214},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/214}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/214}
}
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