Paper 2024/2092

PQConnect: Automated Post-Quantum End-to-End Tunnels

Daniel J. Bernstein, University of Illinois at Chicago, Academia Sinica
Tanja Lange, Eindhoven University of Technology, Academia Sinica
Jonathan Levin, Eindhoven University of Technology, Academia Sinica
Bo-Yin Yang, Academia Sinica
Abstract

This paper introduces PQConnect, a post-quantum end-to-end tunneling protocol that automatically protects all packets between clients that have installed PQConnect and servers that have installed and configured PQConnect. Like VPNs, PQConnect does not require any changes to higher-level protocols and application software. PQConnect adds cryptographic protection to unencrypted applications, works in concert with existing pre-quantum applications to add post-quantum protection, and adds a second application-independent layer of defense to any applications that have begun to incorporate application-specific post-quantum protection. Unlike VPNs, PQConnect automatically creates end-to-end tunnels to any number of servers using automatic peer discovery, with no need for the client administrator to configure per-server information. Each server carries out a client-independent configuration step to publish an announcement that the server's name accepts PQConnect connections. Any PQConnect client connecting to that name efficiently finds this announcement, automatically establishes a post-quantum point-to-point IP tunnel to the server, and routes traffic for that name through that tunnel. The foundation of security in PQConnect is the server's long-term public key used to encrypt and authenticate all PQConnect packets. PQConnect makes a conservative choice of post-quantum KEM for this public key. PQConnect also uses a smaller post-quantum KEM for forward secrecy, and elliptic curves to ensure pre-quantum security even in case of security failures in KEM design or KEM software. Security of the handshake component of PQConnect has been symbolically proven using Tamarin.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) 2025
DOI
10.14722/ndss.2025.241879
Keywords
Network ProtocolsPost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
Contact author(s)
authorcontact-d @ box cr yp to
tanja @ hyperelliptic org
j @ jlev in
byyang @ iis sinica edu tw
History
2024-12-30: approved
2024-12-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/2092
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/2092,
      author = {Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange and Jonathan Levin and Bo-Yin Yang},
      title = {{PQConnect}: Automated Post-Quantum End-to-End Tunnels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/2092},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.14722/ndss.2025.241879},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2092}
}
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