Paper 2024/2086

How To Think About End-To-End Encryption and AI: Training, Processing, Disclosure, and Consent

Mallory Knodel, New York University
Andrés Fábrega, Cornell University
Daniella Ferrari, New York University
Jacob Leiken, New York University
Betty Li Hou, New York University
Derek Yen, New York University
Sam de Alfaro, New York University
Kyunghyun Cho, New York University
Sunoo Park, New York University
Abstract

End-to-end encryption (E2EE) has become the gold standard for securing communications, bringing strong confidentiality and privacy guarantees to billions of users worldwide. However, the current push towards widespread integration of artificial intelligence (AI) models, including in E2EE systems, raises some serious security concerns. This work performs a critical examination of the (in)compatibility of AI models and E2EE applications. We explore this on two fronts: (1) the integration of AI “assistants” within E2EE applications, and (2) the use of E2EE data for training AI models. We analyze the potential security implications of each, and identify conflicts with the security guarantees of E2EE. Then, we analyze legal implications of integrating AI models in E2EE applications, given how AI integration can undermine the confidentiality that E2EE promises. Finally, we offer a list of detailed recommendations based on our technical and legal analyses, including: technical design choices that must be prioritized to uphold E2EE security; how service providers must accurately represent E2EE security; and best practices for the default behavior of AI features and for requesting user consent. We hope this paper catalyzes an informed conversation on the tensions that arise between the brisk deployment of AI and the security offered by E2EE, and guides the responsible development of new AI features.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Artificial IntelligenceSecure messaging
Contact author(s)
mallory knodel @ nyu edu
sunoo park @ nyu edu
History
2024-12-30: revised
2024-12-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/2086
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/2086,
      author = {Mallory Knodel and Andrés Fábrega and Daniella Ferrari and Jacob Leiken and Betty Li Hou and Derek Yen and Sam de Alfaro and Kyunghyun Cho and Sunoo Park},
      title = {How To Think About End-To-End Encryption and {AI}: Training, Processing, Disclosure, and Consent},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/2086},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2086}
}
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