Paper 2024/2047

Breaking and Provably Restoring Authentication: A Formal Analysis of SPDM 1.2 including Cross-Protocol Attacks

Abstract

The SPDM (Security Protocol and Data Model) protocol is a standard under development by the DMTF consortium, and supported by major industry players including Broadcom, Cisco, Dell, Google, HP, IBM, Intel, and NVIDIA. SPDM 1.2 is a complex protocol that aims to provide platform security, for example for communicating hardware components or cloud computing scenarios. In this work, we provide the first holistic, formal analysis of SPDM 1.2: we model the full protocol flow of SPDM considering all of its modes – especially the complex interaction between its different key-exchange modes – in the framework of the Tamarin prover, making our resulting model one of the most complex Tamarin models to date. To our surprise, Tamarin finds a cross-protocol attack that allows a network attacker to completely break authentication of the pre-shared key mode. We implemented our attack on the SPDM reference implementation, and reported the issue to the SPDM developers. DMTF registered our attack as a CVE with CVSS rating 9 (critical). We propose a fix and develop the first formal symbolic proof using the Tamarin prover for the fixed SPDM 1.2 protocol as a whole. The resulting model of the main modes and their interactions is highly complex, and we develop supporting lemmas to enable proving properties in the Tamarin prover, including the absence of all cross-protocol attacks. Our fix has been incorporated into both the reference implementation and the newest version of the standard. Our results highlight the need for a holistic analysis of other internet standards and the importance of providing generalized security guarantees across entire protocols.