Paper 2024/2039
Revisiting Boomerang Attacks on Lightweight ARX and AND-RX Ciphers with Applications to KATAN, SIMON and CHAM
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the security of lightweight block ciphers, focusing on those that utilize the ADD-Rotate-XOR (ARX) and AND-Rotate-XOR (AND-RX) design paradigms. More specifically, we examine their resilience against boomerang-style attacks. First, we propose an automated search strategy that leverages the boomerang connectivity table (BCT) for AND operations (
Note: This postprint corrects two typographical errors in the published manuscript (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2024.103950) -- the labelling of rotations in Figure 6 (pg. 28) and the ABCT switch pattern in the 41-round related-key rectangle distinguisher (pg. 31).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Journal of Information Security and Applications
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2024.103950
- Keywords
- ARXBlock ciphersBoomerang attackBoomerang switchCryptanalysisRectangle attack.
- Contact author(s)
-
yu li @ estudiants urv cat
j teh @ deakin edu au - History
- 2024-12-18: approved
- 2024-12-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/2039
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/2039, author = {Li Yu and Je Sen Teh}, title = {Revisiting Boomerang Attacks on Lightweight {ARX} and {AND}-{RX} Ciphers with Applications to {KATAN}, {SIMON} and {CHAM}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/2039}, year = {2024}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2024.103950}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2039} }