Paper 2024/1987
Side-Channel Attack on ARADI
, School of Cybersecurity, Korea University, South KoreaAbstract
In this study, we present the first side-channel attack on the ARADI block cipher, exposing its vulnerabilities to physical attacks in non-profiled scenarios. We propose a novel bitwise divide-and-conquer methodology tailored for ARADI, enabling key recovery. Furthermore, based on our attack approach, we present a stepwise method for recovering the full 256-bit master key. Through experiments on power consumption traces from an ARM processor, we demonstrate successful recovery of target key bits, validating the effectiveness of our proposed method. Our findings highlight critical weaknesses in physical security of ARADI and underscore the necessity of implementing effective countermeasures to address side-channel vulnerabilities.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Block cipherSide-channel attackNon-profiledPower analysisARM processor
- Contact author(s)
-
donggeun kwon @ gmail com
shhong @ korea ac kr - History
- 2024-12-12: approved
- 2024-12-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1987
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1987,
author = {Donggeun Kwon and Seokhie Hong},
title = {Side-Channel Attack on {ARADI}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1987},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1987}
}
