Paper 2024/1963
Proof of Time: A Method for Verifiable Temporal Commitments Without Timestamp Disclosure
Abstract
This paper introduces a cryptographic method that enables users to prove that an event occurred in the past and that a specified amount of time has since elapsed, without disclosing the exact timestamp of the event. The method leverages zero-knowledge proofs and an on-chain Incremental Merkle Tree to store hash commitments. By utilizing the Poseidon hash function and implementing zero-knowledge circuits in Noir, this approach ensures both the integrity and confidentiality of temporal information.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Contact author(s)
- alexanderjohnlee33 @ gmail com
- History
- 2025-02-18: revised
- 2024-12-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1963
- License
-
CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1963,
author = {Alexander John Lee},
title = {Proof of Time: A Method for Verifiable Temporal Commitments Without Timestamp Disclosure},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1963},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1963}
}
