Paper 2024/194

Helium: Scalable MPC among Lightweight Participants and under Churn

Christian Mouchet, Hasso-Plattner-Institute, University of Potsdam
Sylvain Chatel, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Apostolos Pyrgelis, RISE Research Institutes of Sweden
Carmela Troncoso, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Abstract

We introduce Helium, a novel framework that supports scalable secure multiparty computation (MPC) for lightweight participants and tolerates churn. Helium relies on multiparty homomorphic encryption (MHE) as its core building block. While MHE schemes have been well studied in theory, prior works fall short of addressing critical considerations paramount for adoption such as supporting resource-constrained and unstably connected participants. In this work, we systematize the requirements of MHE-based MPC protocols from a practical lens, and we propose a novel execution mechanism that addresses those considerations. We implement this execution mechanism in Helium, which makes it the first implemented framework to support MPC under network churn based solely on cryptographic assumptions. We show that a Helium network of $30$ parties connected with $100$Mbits/s links and experiencing a system-wide churn rate of $40$ failures per minute can compute the product between a fixed $512\times512$ secret matrix (e.g., a collectively-trained private model) and a fresh secret vector (e.g., a feature vector) $8.3$ times per second. This is $\sim\!\!1500$ times faster than a state-of-the-art MPC framework operating under no churn.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
DOI
10.1145/3658644.3670346
Keywords
Secure multiparty computationMPCMultiparty homomorphic encryptionMHEHomomorphic encryptionHE
Contact author(s)
christian mouchet @ hpi de
sylvain chatel @ cispa de
apostolos pyrgelis @ ri se
carmela troncoso @ epfl ch
History
2024-06-18: revised
2024-02-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/194
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/194,
      author = {Christian Mouchet and Sylvain Chatel and Apostolos Pyrgelis and Carmela Troncoso},
      title = {Helium: Scalable {MPC} among Lightweight Participants and under Churn},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/194},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.1145/3658644.3670346},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/194}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/194}
}
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