Paper 2024/1926

Cryptanalysis of BAKSHEESH Block Cipher

Shengyuan Xu, Shandong University of Science and Technology
Siwei Chen, Hubei University
Xiutao Feng, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science
Zejun Xiang, Hubei University
Xiangyong Zeng, Hubei University
Abstract

BAKSHEESH is a lightweight block cipher following up the well-known cipher GIFT-128, which uses a 4-bit SBox that has a non-trivial Linear Structure (LS). Also, the Sbox requires a low number of AND gates that makes BAKSHEESH stronger to resist the side channel attacks compared to GIFT-128. In this paper, we give the first third-party security analysis of BAKSHEESH from the traditional attacks perspective: integral, differential and linear attacks. Firstly, we propose a framework for integral attacks based on the properties of BAKSHEESH's Sbox and its inverse. By this, we achieve the 9- and 10-round practical key-recovery attacks, and give a 15-round theoretical attack. Secondly, we re-evaluate the security bound against differential cryptanalysis, correcting two errors from the original paper and presenting a key-recovery attack for 19 rounds. At last, for linear cryptanalysis, we develop an automated model for key-recovery attacks and then demonstrate a key-recovery attack for 21 rounds. We stress that our attacks cannot threaten the full-round BAKSHEESH, but give a deep understanding on its security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
BAKSHEESHLightweight Block CipherSecurity EvaluationKey-recovery Attacks
Contact author(s)
xushengyuan @ sdust edu cn
chensiwei_hubu @ 163 com
fengxt @ amss ac cn
xiangzejun @ hubu edu cn
xzeng @ hubu edu cn
History
2024-11-29: approved
2024-11-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1926
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1926,
      author = {Shengyuan Xu and Siwei Chen and Xiutao Feng and Zejun Xiang and Xiangyong Zeng},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of {BAKSHEESH} Block Cipher},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1926},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1926}
}
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