Paper 2024/1900

Opening the Blackbox: Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Tip5, Tip4, Tip4' and Monolith

Fukang Liu, Institute of Science Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Katharina Koschatko, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
Lorenzo Grassi, Ponos Technology, Zug, Switzerland, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Hailun Yan, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
Shiyao Chen, Digital Trust Centre, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Subhadeep Banik, Universita della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
Willi Meier, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland, Windisch, Switzerland
Abstract

A new design strategy for ZK-friendly hash functions has emerged since the proposal of $\mathsf{Reinforced Concrete}$ at CCS 2022, which is based on the hybrid use of two types of nonlinear transforms: the composition of some small-scale lookup tables (e.g., 7-bit or 8-bit permutations) and simple power maps over $\mathbb{F}_p$. Following such a design strategy, some new ZK-friendly hash functions have been recently proposed, e.g., $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}'$ and the $\mathsf{Monolith}$ family. All these hash functions have a small number of rounds, i.e., $5$ rounds for $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, and $\mathsf{Tip4}'$, and $6$ rounds for $\mathsf{Monolith}$ (recently published at ToSC 2024/3). Using the composition of some small-scale lookup tables to build a large-scale permutation over $\mathbb{F}_p$ - which we call S-box - is a main feature in such designs, which can somehow enhance the resistance against the Gröbner basis attack because this large-scale permutation will correspond to a complex and high-degree polynomial representation over $\mathbb{F}_p$. As the first technical contribution, we propose a novel and efficient algorithm to study the differential property of this S-box and to find a conforming input pair for a randomly given input and output difference. For comparison, a trivial method based on the use of the differential distribution table (DDT) for solving this problem will require time complexity $\mathcal{O}(p^2)$. For the second contribution, we also propose new frameworks to devise efficient collision attacks on such hash functions. Based on the differential properties of these S-boxes and the new attack frameworks, we propose the first collision attacks on $3$-round $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, and $\mathsf{Tip4}'$, as well as $2$-round $\mathsf{Monolith}$-$31$ and $\mathsf{Monolith}$-$64$, where the $2$-round attacks on $\mathsf{Monolith}$ are practical. In the semi-free-start (SFS) collision attack setting, we achieve practical SFS collision attacks on $3$-round $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, and $\mathsf{Tip4}'$. Moreover, the SFS collision attacks can reach up to $4$-round $\mathsf{Tip4}$ and $3$-round $\mathsf{Monolith}$-$64$. As far as we know, this is the first third-party cryptanalysis of these hash functions, which improves the initial analysis given by the designers.

Note: This paper is an extended version of the original paper accepted at ToSC 2024.4. All code is provided in our repository: https://github.com/IAIK/ca-tip5family-monolith.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in TOSC 2024
Keywords
Tip5/Tip4/Tip4'Monolith(Semi-Free Start) Collisions
Contact author(s)
liu f ad @ m titech ac jp
katharina koschatko @ tugraz at
lorenzo grassi @ rub de
hailun yan @ ucas ac cn
shiyao chen @ ntu edu sg
subhadeep banik @ usi ch
willimeier48 @ gmail com
History
2024-11-25: revised
2024-11-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1900
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1900,
      author = {Fukang Liu and Katharina Koschatko and Lorenzo Grassi and Hailun Yan and Shiyao Chen and Subhadeep Banik and Willi Meier},
      title = {Opening the Blackbox: Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Tip5, Tip4, Tip4' and Monolith},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1900},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1900}
}
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