Paper 2024/1900
Opening the Blackbox: Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Tip5, Tip4, Tip4' and Monolith
Abstract
A new design strategy for ZK-friendly hash functions has emerged since the proposal of $\mathsf{Reinforced Concrete}$ at CCS 2022, which is based on the hybrid use of two types of nonlinear transforms: the composition of some small-scale lookup tables (e.g., 7-bit or 8-bit permutations) and simple power maps over $\mathbb{F}_p$. Following such a design strategy, some new ZK-friendly hash functions have been recently proposed, e.g., $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}'$ and the $\mathsf{Monolith}$ family. All these hash functions have a small number of rounds, i.e., $5$ rounds for $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, and $\mathsf{Tip4}'$, and $6$ rounds for $\mathsf{Monolith}$ (recently published at ToSC 2024/3). Using the composition of some small-scale lookup tables to build a large-scale permutation over $\mathbb{F}_p$ - which we call S-box - is a main feature in such designs, which can somehow enhance the resistance against the Gröbner basis attack because this large-scale permutation will correspond to a complex and high-degree polynomial representation over $\mathbb{F}_p$. As the first technical contribution, we propose a novel and efficient algorithm to study the differential property of this S-box and to find a conforming input pair for a randomly given input and output difference. For comparison, a trivial method based on the use of the differential distribution table (DDT) for solving this problem will require time complexity $\mathcal{O}(p^2)$. For the second contribution, we also propose new frameworks to devise efficient collision attacks on such hash functions. Based on the differential properties of these S-boxes and the new attack frameworks, we propose the first collision attacks on $3$-round $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, and $\mathsf{Tip4}'$, as well as $2$-round $\mathsf{Monolith}$-$31$ and $\mathsf{Monolith}$-$64$, where the $2$-round attacks on $\mathsf{Monolith}$ are practical. In the semi-free-start (SFS) collision attack setting, we achieve practical SFS collision attacks on $3$-round $\mathsf{Tip5}$, $\mathsf{Tip4}$, and $\mathsf{Tip4}'$. Moreover, the SFS collision attacks can reach up to $4$-round $\mathsf{Tip4}$ and $3$-round $\mathsf{Monolith}$-$64$. As far as we know, this is the first third-party cryptanalysis of these hash functions, which improves the initial analysis given by the designers.
Note: This paper is an extended version of the original paper accepted at ToSC 2024.4. All code is provided in our repository: https://github.com/IAIK/ca-tip5family-monolith.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in TOSC 2024
- Keywords
- Tip5/Tip4/Tip4'Monolith(Semi-Free Start) Collisions
- Contact author(s)
-
liu f ad @ m titech ac jp
katharina koschatko @ tugraz at
lorenzo grassi @ rub de
hailun yan @ ucas ac cn
shiyao chen @ ntu edu sg
subhadeep banik @ usi ch
willimeier48 @ gmail com - History
- 2024-11-25: revised
- 2024-11-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1900
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1900, author = {Fukang Liu and Katharina Koschatko and Lorenzo Grassi and Hailun Yan and Shiyao Chen and Subhadeep Banik and Willi Meier}, title = {Opening the Blackbox: Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Tip5, Tip4, Tip4' and Monolith}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1900}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1900} }