Paper 2024/1897

On Threshold Signatures from MPC-in-the-Head

Eliana Carozza, Université Paris Cité
Geoffroy Couteau, French National Centre for Scientific Research, Université Paris Cité
Abstract

We investigate the feasibility of constructing threshold signature schemes from the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. Our work addresses the significant challenge posed by recent impossibility results (Doerner et al., Crypto’24), which establish inherent barriers to efficient thresholdization of such schemes without compromising their security or significantly increasing the signature size. - We introduce a general methodology to adapt any MPC-in-the-head signature into a threshold-friendly scheme, ensuring that the dependency on the number of users $n$ grows as $\lambda^2n + O(1)$. This represents a substantial improvement over the naive concatenation of independent signatures. - We present a threshold signature scheme on top of the scheme of (Carozza, Couteau and Joux, EUROCRYPT’23). Our security analysis introduces the notion of Corruptible Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attacks (CEUF-CMA), which formalizes resilience against adversarial control over parts of the randomness. Our results provide a new perspective on the trade-offs between efficiency and security in threshold settings, opening pathways for future improvements in post-quantum threshold cryptography.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
SignaturesMPC-in-the-Headthreshold signatures
Contact author(s)
carozza @ irif fr
couteau @ irif fr
History
2024-11-25: approved
2024-11-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1897
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1897,
      author = {Eliana Carozza and Geoffroy Couteau},
      title = {On Threshold Signatures from {MPC}-in-the-Head},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1897},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1897}
}
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