Paper 2024/1883

A Fault Analysis on SNOVA

Gustavo Banegas, Inria Saclay - Île-de-France Research Centre, Computer Science Laboratory of the École Polytechnique
Ricardo Villanueva-Polanco, Technology Innovation Institute
Abstract

SNOVA is a post-quantum cryptographic signature scheme known for its efficiency and compact key sizes, making it a second-round candidate in the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. This paper presents a comprehensive fault analysis of SNOVA, focusing on both permanent and transient faults during signature generation. We introduce several fault injection strategies that exploit SNOVA's structure to recover partial or complete secret keys with limited faulty signatures. Our analysis reveals that as few as $22$ to $68$ faulty signatures, depending on the security level, can suffice for key recovery. We propose a novel fault-assisted reconciliation attack, demonstrating its effectiveness in extracting the secret key space via solving a quadratic polynomial system. Simulations show transient faults in key signature generation steps can significantly compromise SNOVA’s security. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose a lightweight countermeasure to reduce the success of fault attacks without adding significant overhead. Our results highlight the importance of fault-resistant mechanisms in post-quantum cryptographic schemes like SNOVA to ensure robustness.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Physical attackFault-attackSNOVAMQ-based cryptography
Contact author(s)
gustavo @ cryptme in
ricardo polanco @ tii ae
History
2024-11-22: approved
2024-11-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1883
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1883,
      author = {Gustavo Banegas and Ricardo Villanueva-Polanco},
      title = {A Fault Analysis on {SNOVA}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1883},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1883}
}
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