Paper 2024/1872

Amigo: Secure Group Mesh Messaging in Realistic Protest Settings

David Inyangson, Johns Hopkins University
Sarah Radway, Harvard University
Tushar M. Jois, City College of New York
Nelly Fazio, City College of New York
James Mickens, Harvard University
Abstract

During large-scale protests, a repressive government will often disable the Internet to thwart communication between protesters. Smartphone mesh networks, which route messages over short-range, possibly ephemeral, radio connections between nearby phones, allow protesters to communicate without relying on centralized Internet infrastructure. Unfortunately, prior work on providing secure communication in Internet shutdown settings fails to adequately consider protester needs. Previous attempts fail to support efficient private group communication (a crucial requirement for protests), and evaluate their solutions in network environments which fail to accurately capture link churn, physical spectrum contention, and the mobility models found in realistic protest settings. In this paper, we introduce Amigo, a novel mesh messaging system which supports group communication through a decentralized approach to continuous key agreement, and forwards messages using a novel routing protocol. Amigo is uniquely designed to handle the challenges of ad-hoc routing scenarios, where dynamic network topologies and node mobility make achieving key agreement nontrivial. Our extensive simulations reveal the poor scalability of prior approaches, the benefits of Amigo's protest-specific optimizations, and the challenges that still must be solved to scale secure mesh networks to protests with thousands of participants.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS 2025
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765133
Keywords
mesh messagingcensorship circumventioncontinuous group key agreementmesh routing protocolsmobility modeling
Contact author(s)
dinyang1 @ jhu edu
sradway @ g harvard edu
tjois @ ccny cuny edu
nfazio @ ccny cuny edu
mickens @ g harvard edu
History
2025-10-06: revised
2024-11-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1872
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1872,
      author = {David Inyangson and Sarah Radway and Tushar M. Jois and Nelly Fazio and James Mickens},
      title = {Amigo: Secure Group Mesh Messaging in Realistic Protest Settings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1872},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765133},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1872}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.