Paper 2024/1871

Field-Agnostic SNARKs from Expand-Accumulate Codes

Alexander R. Block, University of Illinois at Chicago
Zhiyong Fang, Texas A&M University
Jonathan Katz, University of Maryland, College Park, Google (United States)
Justin Thaler, Georgetown University, a16z crypto research
Hendrik Waldner, Nethermind Research
Yupeng Zhang, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Abstract

Efficient realizations of succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) have gained popularity due to their practical applications in various domains. Among existing schemes, those based on error-correcting codes are of particular interest because of their good concrete efficiency, transparent setup, and plausible post-quantum security. However, many existing code-based SNARKs suffer from the disadvantage that they only work over specific finite fields. In this work, we construct a code-based SNARK that does not rely on any specific underlying field; i.e., it is field-agnostic. Our construction follows the framework of Brakedown (CRYPTO '23) and builds a polynomial commitment scheme (and hence a SNARK) based on recently introduced expand-accumulate codes. Our work generalizes these codes to arbitrary finite fields; our main technical contribution is showing that, with high probability, these codes have constant rate and constant relative distance (crucial properties for building efficient SNARKs), solving an open problem from prior work. As a result of our work we obtain a SNARK where, for a statement of size $M$ , the prover time is $O(M \log M )$ and the proof size is $O(\sqrt{M} )$. We demonstrate the concrete efficiency of our scheme empirically via experiments. Proving ECDSA verification on the secp256k1 curve requires only 0.23s for proof generation, 2 orders of magnitude faster than SNARKs that are not field-agnostic. Compared to the original Brakedown result (which is also field-agnostic), we obtain proofs that are 1.9–2.8$\times$ smaller due to the good concrete distance of our underlying error-correcting code, while introducing only a small overhead of 1.2$\times$ in the prover time.

Note: Full version of the paper with the same title published at CRYPTO 2024. Corresponding CRYPTO 2024 artifact can be found at https://artifacts.iacr.org/crypto/2024/a10/.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2024
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-68403-6_9
Keywords
Field-agnosticSNARKsEA CodesPCSConcretely Efficient
Contact author(s)
alexander r block @ gmail com
zhiyong fang 1997 @ gmail com
jkatz2 @ gmail com
justin r thaler @ gmail com
hendrik waldner @ nethermind io
zhangyp @ illinois edu
History
2024-11-18: approved
2024-11-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1871
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1871,
      author = {Alexander R. Block and Zhiyong Fang and Jonathan Katz and Justin Thaler and Hendrik Waldner and Yupeng Zhang},
      title = {Field-Agnostic {SNARKs} from Expand-Accumulate Codes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1871},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-68403-6_9},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1871}
}
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