Paper 2024/1864

Tweakable ForkCipher from Ideal Block Cipher

Abstract

In ASIACRYPT 2019, Andreeva et al. introduced a new symmetric key primitive called the $\mathit{\text{forkcipher}}$, designed for lightweight applications handling short messages. A forkcipher is a keyed function with a public tweak, featuring fixed-length input and fixed-length (expanding) output. They also proposed a specific forkcipher, ForkSkinny, based on the tweakable block cipher SKINNY, and its security was evaluated through cryptanalysis. Since then, several efficient AEAD and MAC schemes based on forkciphers have been proposed, catering not only to short messages but also to various purposes such as leakage resilience and cloud security. While forkciphers have proven to be efficient solutions for designing AEAD schemes, the area of forkcipher design remains unexplored, particularly the lack of provably secure forkcipher constructions. In this work, we propose forkcipher design for various tweak lengths, based on a block cipher as the underlying primitive. We provide proofs of security for these constructions, assuming the underlying block cipher behaves as an ideal block cipher. First, we present a forkcipher, $$, for an $$-bit tweak and prove its optimal ($$-bit) security. Next, we propose another construction, $$, for a $$-bit tweak, also proving its optimal ($$-bit) security. Finally, we introduce a construction, $$, for a general $$-bit tweak, achieving $$-bit security.

Note: The original version of this paper was published in IACR Communications in Cryptology (2024, Volume 1, Issue 3). However, during the review process for ArcticCrypt 2025, reviewers highlighted a birthday attack on our first proposed construction for an optimally secure forkcipher with an n-bit tweak using three n-bit ideal block ciphers. We modified the construction to restore optimal security in this revised version.