Paper 2024/1850
Single-trace side-channel attacks on MAYO exploiting leaky modular multiplication
, Royal Institute of Technology, Royal Institute of TechnologyAbstract
In response to the quantum threat, new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms will soon be deployed to replace existing public-key schemes. MAYO is a quantum-resistant digital signature scheme whose small keys and signatures make it suitable for widespread adoption, including on embedded platforms with limited security resources. This paper demonstrates two single-trace side-channel attacks on a MAYO implementation in ARM Cortex-M4 that recover a secret key with probabilities of 99.9% and 91.6%, respectively. Both attacks use deep learning-assisted power analysis exploiting information leakage during modular multiplication to reveal a vector in the oil space. This vector is then extended to a full secret key using algebraic techniques.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Side-channel analysisMAYOMultivariate cryptographyPost-quantum digital signatureKey recovery attack
- Contact author(s)
-
jendral @ kth se
dubrova @ kth se - History
- 2024-11-15: approved
- 2024-11-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1850
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1850,
author = {Sönke Jendral and Elena Dubrova},
title = {Single-trace side-channel attacks on {MAYO} exploiting leaky modular multiplication},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1850},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1850}
}
