Breaking BASS

Simon-Philipp Merz; Kenneth G. Paterson; Àlex Rodríguez García

Paper 2024/1808

Breaking BASS

Simon-Philipp Merz

, ETH Zurich

Kenneth G. Paterson

, ETH Zurich

Àlex Rodríguez García, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya

Abstract

We provide several attacks on the BASS signature scheme introduced by Grigoriev, Ilmer, Ovchinnikov and Shpilrain in 2023. We lay out a trivial forgery attack which generates signatures passing the scheme's probabilistic signature verification with high probability. Generating these forgeries is faster than generating signatures honestly. Moreover, we describe a key-only attack which allows us to recover an equivalent private key from a signer's public key. The time complexity of this recovery is asymptotically the same as that of signing messages.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Contact author(s): research @ simon-philipp com
kenny paterson @ inf ethz ch
alex rodriguez garcia @ upc edu
History: 2024-11-08: approved; 2024-11-05: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/1808
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1808,
      author = {Simon-Philipp Merz and Kenneth G. Paterson and Àlex Rodríguez García},
      title = {Breaking {BASS}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1808},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1808}
}